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Did the Individual Consent to the Risk of Harm? A Comparative 
Jurisdictional Analysis of Consent in Cases of Sexual 
Transmission/Exposure to HIV 
Abstract: This article considers the necessary ingredients for an individual to consent 
to running the risk of the HIV virus being transmitted through high risk unprotected 
sexual intercourse.  In order to achieve this aim an assessment of what should 
equate to a fully informed consent is evaluated. The article will provide a 
comparative jurisdictional analysis of the consent requirement in three particularised 
jurisdictions: England, Canada and the  U.S.A. A comparison of relational judicial 
precepts will follow the discussion of extant law in each country. It will be established 
that few jurisdictions fully consider the requirements of a fully informed consent. The 
final part of the article will suggest a bespoke new legislative framework that will 
account for the circumstances that are necessary for an individual to provide a fully 
informed consent to the risk of acquiring the virus.  
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Introduction 
 
The criminalisation of the sexual transmission of HIV is still fertile ground for 
academic extirpation.  There have been many academic comments on the subject, 
but very little exploration of the parameters of a fully informed consent.1 The Law 
Commission have recently broached the sexual transmission of disease, but little 
attention was paid to the awareness of the complainant when consenting to 
                                            
1 For example see: Matthew Weait,  ‘Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica’  (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 121; 
Lisa Cherkassky, ‘Being Informed: The Complexities of Knowledge, Deception and Consent when Transmitting HIV’ (2010)  74 Journal of 
Criminal Law 242; Samantha Ryan, ‘Disclosure and HIV transmission’ (2015) 79 Journal of Criminal Law 395, 
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unprotected intercourse with an HIV+ individual.2 It is evident that there is no true 
clarity on what ought to equate to a fully informed consent, and this is in need of 
clarification. 
 
In order to address this question this paper focuses upon the parameters of a fully 
informed consent, and surveys three particularised countries. The current 
conceptualisation of consent is deficient in the majority of compared jurisdictions. 
Generally, the complainant is not afforded the opportunity to make a fully informed 
decision, as the basic premise asserts that the defence is fully operational once a 
complainant becomes ‘aware’ of the defendant’s sero-status.3 The disclosing of 
one’s sero-status does not signify that the complainant is attentive to the risk of the 
virus being transmitted, and this can be consider deficient.  
 
The first section of this article will provide an effective definition of consent, within the 
context of HIV transmission/exposure, where factual and normative consent are 
considered. It will be demonstrated that both of these elements are necessary for 
there to be an informed consent.  It is also essential to outline the parameters of a 
fully informed consent to be able proceed to evaluating the effectiveness or 
deficiency within the various legislative frameworks, and judicial precepts of the 
jurisdictions within this analysis.   
 
The second section will set out the applicable law in England relational to consent 
and the transmission/exposure of HIV. The current position is that the consent of the 
                                            
2 Law Commission, Reform of the Offences Against the Person ( No 361, 2015) 
3 R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103, 3 All ER 593; R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 SCR 371; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-123 (2017); Cal. Health & 
Safety Code § 12029(2016)  
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complainant may be a defence that can be put to the fact finder for deliberation. 4  It 
will be demonstrated that the extant law does not provide any guidance, and that 
there has been no real consideration of normative consent.  The subsequent part of 
the chapter considers the Canadian position where it will be demonstrated that 
consent can be a defence in these cases. 5 However, the decisions that emanate 
from this jurisdiction have not explored the parameters of an effective consent. The 
position, like England, is that there may not be a fully informed consent on all 
occasions, and disclosure of one’s sero-status is deemed sufficient for exculpation 
purposes.  
 
The American position on consent will then be considered. This will highlight the 
divergent approaches to consent within the HIV State specific legislative frameworks. 
There are States that allow consent;6 those that require disclosure;7 and those where 
there is no expressly stipulated provision on disclosure or consent.8  It will be shown 
that the majority of states do not take into account that the complainant ‘ought’ to be 
consenting to running the risk of infection. There are, however, states that have 
enacted legislation to accommodate normative consent, and thereby allow a fully 
informed consent.  
 
The penultimate part of this work will provide the comparative analysis, and this 
identifies the similarities and differences within each designated jurisdiction.  The 
comparison is divided into three distinct approaches:  basic disclosure; quasi-
enhanced disclosure; and enhanced disclosure. This terminology has never been 
                                            
4 R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 
5 R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 SCR 371 
6 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12-5.01;  Mo. Rev. Stat. § 191.677 (2016) 
7 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-123 (2017); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 120291 (2017)  and  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.11(2016) 
8 Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.011 
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fully considered, and provides the framework for the proposed legislation.  It is 
argued that in the majority of jurisdictions only consider factual consent, and  that 
there is no true consideration of  the significance of normative consent. Finally, the 
culmination of the chapter will provide an optimal model for a statutory footing that 
facilitates consent as a defence. This relies upon elements of Ohio’s statutory 
provision, ensuring that an effective consent will be attained on all occasions.  This 
bespoke legislative framework will provide clarity. 
 
 
What should be considered as an effective consent? 
 
Consenting to harm, or a risk of harm, seems to be a relatively undemanding 
concept to comprehend as an individual will either grant their consent or refuse to 
acquiesce. The simplicity of consent is delusional,9 and it is imperative to determine 
the constructional basis of valid consent within criminal HIV transmission/exposure 
cases.10 Generally, consent, that is legally permissible, transpires if a complainant 
permits the defendant to perform an act that will cause harm, or a risk of harm, to the 
consentor, and fits within the overarching public policy of the particularised legal 
system.11  Enabling that person to consent provides an individual with authority over 
the consentor to commit an act that would otherwise be criminal: subject, as stated, 
to overarching public policy considerations.12 For there to be sufficient consent, it 
must be given voluntarily by an individual who has made an informed choice.13 The 
                                            
9 See generally Peter Westen,  The Logic of Consent (Ashgate Publishing 2004) 
10  See generally Matthew Weait and Yusef Azad, ‘The Criminalization of HIV Transmission in England and Wales: Questions of Law and 
Policy (2005) 10 HIV/ AIDS Policy and Law Review 1  http://www.aidslaw.ca/site/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/EngWales_HIV-
Review10-2-E.pdf accessed 18th November 2017;  John R. Spencer, 'Retrial for Reckless Infection' (2004) 154 New Law Journal 762 
11 R v Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212 
12 See generally Vera Bergelson, ‘Consent to Harm’ (2008) 28 Pace Law Review 683 
13 ibid,  701 
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complainant in these circumstances bestows the defendant with authorization to 
interfere with their bodily integrity.14 
 
Witmer-Rich15 submits that a ‘legally valid consent’ consists of two elements.  Firstly, 
there must be ‘factual consent’, in that the complainant acknowledges that they 
consent to allowing that person to embark upon the course of  conduct that infringes 
upon their bodily integrity.16  This form of concurrence may be established either 
subjectively,  performatively or as a hybrid of the subjective and performative 
models.17  
 
The second element that ought to be satisfied is normative consent.18 ‘Normative 
consent’ reinforces the factual consent if three conditions are met.19 It is generally 
recognised that normative consent consists of knowledge, freedom and competence: 
however, the parameters of these conditions are contentious.20 If any of these 
ingredients are omitted then it is pertinent to assume that there cannot be a legally 
valid consent.21 Factual consent and normative consent will now considered. 
 
Factual Consent: Subjective, Performative Or A Hybrid? 
 
Factual consent is considered an essential, but insufficient, component to the 
defence of consent.22  It forms the foundation on which the court/fact-finder can 
determine whether the complainant has truly consented to normally prohibited 
conduct. There are three schools of thought on the construction of factual consent.23 
                                            
14 Jonathan Witmer-Rich, ‘It’s Good to be Autonomous: Prospective Consent, Retrospective Consent, and the Foundation of Consent in the 
Criminal Law’ (2011) 5 Criminal Law and Philosophy 377,397 
15 ibid, 379 
16 ibid, 379 
17Alan Wertheimer ‘What Is Consent? And is it Important?’ (2000) 3 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 557, 566 
18 Witmer-Rich (n 14), 379 
19 Westen (n 9) 7 
20 ibid  7 
21 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford University Press 1984) 35-36 not a wrong if have given freely informed consent 
22 Westen (n 9)  25 
23 Wertheimer (n 17), 566 
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The subjective view is promulgated upon the assumption that factual consent is 
attributed to the mental state of the complainant.24 Hurd, a proponent of the 
subjective model, suggests that the primary focus of factual consent must be 
assessed subjectively, as it affects the rights and duties of the individuals involved.25 
By enabling subjective consent it  demonstrates the ‘exercise of free will’.26  It has 
been considered that it is the intention of the consentor  to engage in the risky 
activity that enables an individual to cross any moral boundary or, alternatively, it is 
believed to be an intention to forego any moral objection to the interference.27 Both 
suggestions equate to a subjective assessment of factual consent, and neither need 
take preference over the other. This subjective analysis may seem appropriate in 
defining factual consent in certain types of criminal offence, for example rape,28 but 
may be incongruous to HIV transmission/exposure cases because the forming of the 
intention, by the complainant, to permit the defendant to interfere with their bodily 
integrity, may be deficient. How would a defendant be aware that the complainant 
was willing to embark upon acts of intimacy when the complainant has merely 
formed a mental agreement. More than a cognitive recognition can be expected as 
the defendant may be oblivious, without further indications, that the complainant 
agrees to any unprotected activity.29  
 
The next variant of factual consent is the performative model.30 This advocates that 
the consentor must express that they acquiesce  to the interference with their 
autonomy and bodily integrity.31 Under this proposition the agreement can originate 
via words or by actions.32 An expression of the agreement, it has been suggested, 
unequivocally conveys to the recipient that the complainant consents.33 To view 
factual consent exclusively upon the performative assumption would not be 
applicable to HIV transmission/exposure cases because the complainant must also 
                                            
24  ibid, 566 
25 Heidi Hurd, ‘The Moral Magic of Consent’ (1996) 2 Legal Theory 121,124-25 
26 ibid,124-25; Larry Alexander, ‘The Moral Magic of Consent (II)’ (1996) 2 Legal Theory 165  
27 Hurd (n 25) 124-25; Larry Alexander, The Moral Magic of Consent (II) (1996). 2 Legal Theory 165; Wertheimer (n 17), 567 
28David P. Bryden, ‘Redefining Rape’ (2000) 3 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 317,355  
29 Wertheimer (n 17), 568 
30 ibid, 566 
30 ibid, 567 
31 ibid, 567 
32 J.L. Austin, How to do Things with Words (Oxford University Press 1962) 99 
33 Wertheimer ( n17) 567 ; J.L. ibid, 99 
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form an intention to agree to unprotected intercourse.  Words or actions may not 
have this effect as what we say is not conclusive in these circumstances. The 
complainant may expressly consent to having intercourse, however, cognitive 
recognition of that acceptance is still essential.  
 
The hybrid method takes into consideration both subjective and performative 
consent as part of an eclectic and evaluative duality of considerations. The blending 
of both of these elements may appease proponents of both persuasions.  Westen34  
proposes that performative consent is extrapolated from subjective factual consent 
as this is a core concept,35 thereby indicating that subjective factual consent is 
necessary.  It is incomprehensible to understand how an individual can consent 
without mentally complying with any interference. An individual would only be able to 
express their factual consent after mentally acknowledging they acquiesce.  It follows 
that a subjective agreement cannot be recognized unless there is some type of 
express accord, whether by words or actions. This is at its most evident in cases of 
consensual intercourse as there must be words or actions that signify that that 
person agrees to sexual intimacy.  A combination of the subjective and performative 
consent clarifies the position of acquiescence by accommodating a mental 
agreement and some form of action by the complainant. This hybrid model is at its 
most apposite in criminal HIV transmission/exposure cases as a mental agreement, 
and the performative aspect, would conclusively embody that the complainant was 
factually consenting before normative consent can be taken into account.  
 
The Essential Ingredients Of Normative Consent 
 
It is generally recognised that the complainant’s awareness must consist of 
knowledge, freedom and competence, but the parameters of these conditions are 
                                            
34 Westen (n 9) 
35 ibid 27 ‘it is a  core concept of consent in that other conceptions of consent are conceptually derivative of it including factual expressive 
consent’ 
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contentious.36 It is assumed, for current determination, that a complainant’s 
knowledge will emanate from the traditional philosophical assumption of  the term.37  
If knowledge is to be portrayed in this manner then the complainant must be fully 
aware that the defendant is carrying the virus, and that there are risks of having the 
virus transmitted by having unprotected intercourse with an individual with that 
status. The complainant, under these conditions, must have that justified true belief 
in the defendant’s HIV status, and the implications of having intercourse with that 
person, to be capable of consenting to running the risk of harm, because only then 
can it be said that they are fully aware.38  
 
The freedom to make that choice signifies that the complainant must not be coerced 
into making a decision or be deceived.39 She must act autonomously without any 
external influence, otherwise the freedom of choice would be deficient.40 A truly 
liberal approach to consent endorses this freedom of choice and provides a 
complainant with the opportunity to forego their right to protect themselves from 
potential bodily harm.41 Any individual who consents must also be competent.42 For 
example, a mentally incapacitated, intoxicated or an under-age individual would be 
incapable to consent to running the risk of harm. Only if the three conditions of 
knowledge, freedom and competence coalesce can it eventuate that there is 
normative consent.43 
The parameters of consent have been identified: namely that factual consent, and 
normative consent are essential elements for an individual to consent to running the 
risk of the transmission of HIV through unprotected sexual intercourse.44 It is now 
necessary to explore the extant substantive position in English law, and this will be 
critically analysed before evaluating the other comparator jurisdiction perspectives. 
                                            
36 ibid 7 
37 Proposition knowledge is traditionally considered to be a justified true belief in the existence of a fact: Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, and 
Matthias Steup , ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition) Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 1 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/knowledge-analysis/ accessed 18th November 2017 
38 Westen (n 9) 187 -189 
39 Westen (n 9) 180 
40 Joel Feinberg (n 21)116 
41 Ibid, 116 
42 Westen (n 9) 189-191 
43 ibid 7 
44 For a discussion of informed consent in the context of HIV criminalisation see:  Kim Shayo Buchanan, ‘When Is HIV a 
Crime? Sexuality, Gender and Consent’ (2015)  99 Minnesota Law Review 1231 Ar 
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The US States have enacted specific legislation, whilst the Canadian approach is 
focused upon the general criminal law, and this provides an appropriate balance to the 
comparative analysis.  In general terms, the ambit of consent as a defence in English 
law to the potential liability for non-fatal/sexual crimes has arisen in an ad hoc and 
solipsistic manner. The truism that hard cases make bad law45 is reflected in the 
uncertain moral barometer that governs this arena.  
 
The English Position on Consent and HIV Transmission 
 
Generally, common law and statute authorise a defendant to rely upon a 
complainant consenting to various non-fatal and sexual offences.46   In other 
circumstances the defence is not permissible.47 The contemporary premise, within 
the criminal transmission of HIV, is that the consent of the complainant can operate 
as a defence, and a soft paternalistic approach has been embraced.48 The defence 
is available to defendants who have transmitted the virus to a complainant, where 
that complainant has consented to unprotected intercourse knowing that that person 
has the virus.49 It is ‘logical’ to presume that the defendant could not have a 
reasonable belief of the complainant consenting to intercourse with an HIV+ 
individual if the defendant has not divulged their status.50  
 
In Dica,51 the Court of Appeal expressly stipulated that consenting to intercourse 
does not imply that the complainant consented to intercourse with an HIV+ 
individual. In order for the complainant to fully consent she must be aware that the 
defendant has the virus; there must be a disclosure by the defendant of their sero- 
status.  Consent may even be deemed to be a ‘collateral issue’ as disclosure can 
                                            
45 R v Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212 (n 11);  Slingsby [1995] Crim. LR 570; Wilson  [1996] 2 Cr App R 241; Crim. LR 573; R v Emmett (CA 18 
June 1999)   
46 R v Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212 (n 11);   s74 Sexual Offences Act 2003 
47 ibid 
48 R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 
49 ibid 
50 Lisa Cherkassky, ‘Being Informed: The Complexities of Knowledge, Deception and Consent when Transmitting HIV’ (2010)  74 Journal 
of Criminal Law 242, 248 
51 ibid 
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emerge as the crux of the matter.52 This is at its most evident when the complainant 
may acquire the requisite information from a source other than the defendant.53 The 
judiciary are unequivocal on this matter as Judge LJ promulgated examples whereby 
the complainant would acquire that knowledge from other sources.54  
 
English Criminal Law Precepts: Facilitating The Defence Of Consent 
 
In Dica,55  the defendant was charged under section 20 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861,56 and accused of transmitting HIV to two unsuspecting 
complainants. At trial, Dica sought to rely upon the consent of the complainants. It 
was stated that consent, even if it existed, was irrelevant.57 Justice Philpott relied 
upon Brown as the authority for this proposition.58  In Brown,59 the majority 
determined that where any harm was intended and/or caused there would be no 
consent unless it fell within a legitimate public policy exception.60 At the time of 
Dica’s trial there was no exception for consensual unprotected intercourse where 
HIV was transmitted. 
 
The decision in Brown61 was distinguished by the Court of Appeal in Dica,62 and 
delineated in terms of parameters and ambit.63 It was highlighted that the factual 
pattern of behaviour in Brown comprised of acts where there was the ‘deliberate and 
intentional inflection of bodily harm’,64 whereas Dica concerned consensual 
intercourse: 
                                            
52 Samantha Ryan, ‘Disclosure and HIV transmission’ (2015) 79 Journal of Criminal Law 395,399 
53 R. v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706 [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 14[44] 
54 ibid 
55 R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 
56 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s20. Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any grievous bodily harm upon 
any other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor (sic), and 
being convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude 
57 R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103[13] 
58 ibid 
59 R v Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212 (n 11) 
60 ibid 234 
61 ibid 
62 R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 
63 ibid [46] 
64 ibid [45]  
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“It does not follow from them, and they do not suggest, that consensual acts of 
sexual intercourse are unlawful merely because there may be a known risk to the 
health of one or other participant.”65  
 
Clearly, consensual unprotected intercourse, and ‘running of the risk’ were the 
pivotal issues that enabled the defence of consent to be galvanised, or not, in terms 
of informed consent. Cherskassky66 proposes that by delineating the running of the 
risk to the contrary position of policy, advocated in Brown,  the case  ‘drew an 
interesting line regarding consent and HIV transmission’.67  If unprotected sexual 
intercourse between two consenting adults, meant that the virus would always be 
transmitted, then the defence may not have been permitted, and the policy decisions 
and construct adopted by the majority in Brown might have prevailed in HIV 
transmission precedents. 
 
Judge LJ  in Dica impliedly  endorsed running the risk as one of the ‘good reasons’ 
that were set out in Brown.68 The rationale of the dicta has been questioned as it has 
been suggested that permitting an individual to consent to be infected with a 
potentially deadly virus can never be a ‘good reason’. 69  It is not consent to being 
infected with the virus that was being endorsed; it is the running the risk of infection 
to which the informed complainant would be autonomously consenting via ‘lawful’ 
sexual intercourse. Throughout the judgment, acknowledgement of the risk was 
recognised. Judge LJ did state that: 
 
 “if the appellant concealed the truth about his condition from them, and therefore 
kept them in ignorance of it, there was no reason for them to think that they were 
running any risk of infection, and they were not consenting to it. On this basis, there 
                                            
65 ibid [46] 
66 Cherkassky ( n 50) 
67 ibid, 248 
68 R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103[46] 
69 George R. Mawhinney, ‘To be Ill or to Kill: The Criminality of Contagion’ (2013) Journal of Criminal Law 202, 207 
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would be no consent sufficient in law to provide the appellant with a defence to the 
charge under s.20.”70 
 
The statement implies that if a defendant discloses their sero-status  this would be a 
sufficient revelation to be able to rely upon the defence of consent. Yet a disclosure 
of this type fails to take into consideration whether the complainant was fully aware 
that unprotected intercourse would create a risk of infection. Spencer71 even 
suggests that the complainant must have full knowledge of the facts,72 and proposed 
that Dica struck the ‘appropriate balance’ as a defendant who does not disclose will 
be liable, whilst those who do disclose will not be accountable.73 This proposition 
indicates that disclosure of the HIV status is the primordial requirement, and that this 
factorisation will enable the defence of consent to operate; nothing of the risk 
associated with such activity needed to be established. It is presumed that a 
complainant would always be aware of the risk of transmission, but this is simply not 
the case. Allowing disclosure in isolation does not take into account statistics on the 
awareness of transmission routes.74 A ‘significant minority’ appear to be unaware that 
the virus can be transmitted via sexual intercourse.75 It signifies that a naïve individual 
may be blissfully unaware of this risk associated with certain activities. If such a 
person is unaware then how could they be said to have fully consented to the risk of 
infection? This is not the realms of fantasy; for example, a complainant aged sixteen 
may not be fully aware  that they were consenting to running the risk of infection, but 
they would still be competent to have unprotected intercourse with an HIV+ individual. 
 
Konzani: The Complainant Being Aware Of The Risk Of Transmission Through 
Sexual Intercourse 
                                            
70 ibid [38] 
71 John R. Spencer, 'Retrial for Reckless Infection' (2004) 154 New Law Journal 762, 
72 ibid, 767  
73 ibid; Cherkassky (n 50),  248 
74  National Aids Trust  HIV Public Knowledge and Attitudes, 2014 
<http://www.nat.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Mori_2014_report_FINAL_0.pdf >  accessed 18th November 2017 
75As above 
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The lack of clarity emanating from Dica is also evident in the other leading case of 
Konzani. In Konzani,76 the defendant was accused of infecting three females with 
HIV. It was alleged that none of the complainants were aware of the defendant’s 
sero-status.77 The defendant appealed on the basis that the complainants had 
consented to unprotected intercourse, and it could be implied that they had 
consented to running the risk of infection.78 It was claimed that the judge had 
misdirected the jury by removing the opportunity to contemplate whether  the 
defendant may have had an honest belief that she had consented.79 The case 
addressed how a complainant can acquire knowledge of a defendant’s sero-status, 
and seemed to clarify the parameters of consent. It was confirmed that any consent 
must be fully informed and that: 
 “the defendant is not to be convicted if there was, or may have been an informed 
consent by his sexual partner to the risk that he would transfer the HIV virus to 
her.”80  
 
This connotes that the complainant must not only be aware of the status of the 
defendant, but also that they must be alert to the risks associated with unprotected 
intercourse. Any such assertion corresponds to, and contradicts elements of the 
dictum that can be derived from Dica. It is a disclosure where the complainant knows 
of the risk that the virus may be transmitted that ought to be considered appropriate.  
Konzani also raised the issue of implied consent and that inculcation requires further 
elaboration. 
 
Konzani And The Complaint Impliedly Consenting To Intercourse With An HIV+ 
Individual  
 
                                            
76 R. v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706 [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 14 
77 ibid [3] 
78 ibid [5] 
79 ibid [36] 
80 ibid [43] 
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The judgment in Konzani,81 reiterated that any consent must be fully informed, but in 
total contrast stipulated conditions whereby consent could be implied, denoting that 
the defendant may potentially form an honest belief that the complainant is 
consenting to running the risk of becoming infected.  Judge LJ opined how 
knowledge of the defendant’s sero-status could be acquired, but afforded no 
indication as to how the knowledge of the risks associated with unprotected 
intercourse with an HIV+ individual could be obtained.82 His Lordship provided 
illustrations of when a complainant may acquire knowledge of the defendant’s HIV 
status. It was recognised that the complainant could gain the requisite facts from a 
hospital environment or via a third party.83  This insinuates that the defendant would 
not have to participate in any declaration of their HIV status, thereby enabling implied 
consent to enter into the realms of HIV transmission.  Authorising  the consentor to 
acquiesce by acquiring knowledge from another source may be understood to have 
enhanced that person’s autonomy. They may be making an informed choice, and it 
may be asserted that it is a free willed decision evading any coercion from the 
defendant. Contrarily, such information may be inadequate as the complainant may 
only discover the most basic of information. The judgment is contradictory by 
requiring an informed consent, then stipulating that the disclosure of HIV status, 
whether by the defendant or another party, was sufficient to establish that the 
complainant was willing to run the risk as nothing else needed to be adduced.84  
 
Weait,85 presciently in light of the actual judgment, set out a liberal perspective on 
consent, extending the parameters of implied consent to circumstances where the 
complainant is aware of the risks:  
 
“…the defence should be available because in each of these cases that person is 
aware of the risk of transmission. They may be ignorant of a partner's HIV positive 
status in the sense that this has not been disclosed to them by him, but to deny the 
                                            
81 ibid 
82 ibid [44] 
83 ibid [44] 
84 ibid [44] 
85 Matthew Weait,  ‘Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica’  (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 121 
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defence if there is in fact knowledge of the risk, and a willingness to accept it, would 
be tantamount to saying that the person infected bears no responsibility for their own 
sexual and physical health”86  
 
It was suggested that under these conditions the complainant would potentially have 
knowledge of the defendant’s HIV status, and thereby would be consenting to 
running the risk of transmission. Weait has subsequently stated that the examples 
promulgated in Konzani were not extensive and limited to situations where 
disclosure has effectively taken place.87 Ryan also suggests that the examples are 
‘limited’.88 The proposal advocated by Weait and Ryan extend the parameters of the 
defence to circumstances whereby a complainant is aware that there is a possibility 
of the defendant having the virus, and they have not disclosed their status to the 
complainant.89 The term ‘possibility’ does not equate to actual awareness, and 
therefore is not actual knowledge. If there has been no disclosure by the defendant, 
it would be feasible for the complainant to envisage that the defendant did not have 
the virus. It seems that Weait and Ryan anticipate an extension of implied consent 
that would potentially sanction further deceitful conduct by the defendant, and place 
the onus upon the complainant.  This is arguably incorrect as it would swing the 
pendulum too much towards the awareness of risk and disassociate consent from 
disclosure.  A less onerous position, for culpability purposes, would stipulate that the 
complainant must not only know that the defendant has the virus, but also that the 
type of activity may run the risk of becoming infected. The onus ought to be on the 
defendant to disseminate the relevant facts; the issue of implied consent should be 
negated in these cases.  
 
 
Judge LJ arguably erred in Konzani  by yielding to certain pro-defendant 
concessions. Furthermore, acknowledging that the information may originate from 
                                            
86 ibid, 128 
87 Matthew Weait, ‘Knowledge, Autonomy and Consent: R. v Konzani’ (2005) Criminal Law Review 763, 768 
88 Ryan (n 52), 398 
89 Weait, ‘Knowledge, Autonomy and Consent’ (n 87), 768 
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various sources, does not denote that the complainant would be aware that there 
may be risk of infection.90 Allowing an individual to rely upon the information 
emanating from a third party does not imply that the defendant would have an honest 
belief that the complainant was consenting to unprotected intercourse with a HIV+ 
individual, everything is speculative. This is an unfortunate element of the judgment 
as it enables a defendant to avoid conviction for culpable conduct. Enabling the 
knowledge of the virus to emanate from a third party permits a defendant to act with 
the appropriate mens rea, transmit the virus, and still evade liability for their conduct. 
This haphazard development of how the defence functions warrants more 
clarification. The ‘loophole’ allows a defendant to be reckless, whilst placing the onus 
upon the complainant. Cherkassky has cogently adumbrated in this regard that  
enabling the consent to derive from other parties, ‘would render the defendant's 
knowledge of his own HIV status irrelevant, leading to the dangerous assumption 
that the assailant need not divulge his status at all.’ 91 If the knowledge from a third 
party is to act as a defence that functions correctly then Cherkassky argues that the 
complainant must inform the defendant of their awareness.92 Reed and Cooper 
concurred with this overarching culpability proposition: 
 
“Where the defence of consent is to operate, it should surely be limited to those 
situations where it removes the defendant's culpability and blameworthiness 
because he is aware that the victim has knowledge of the risk at the relevant time 
and is therefore consenting.”93 
 
Even where the complainant discloses awareness of the defendant’s condition it 
does not indicate a fully informed consent, but this may equate to a ‘reluctant 
consent’ that has very recently received appellate endorsement, albeit 
controversially in Watson,94 and falls firmly within the ambit of factual consent. Dodds 
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et al,95 consider that disclosure is currently, a ‘precondition for relying upon the 
defence but it is the consent to the risk that actually matters’.96 A basic disclosure is 
insufficient; it is the complainant being aware of there being a risk of transmission 
that fulfils the obligation that attains a fully informed consent. Only then will an 
essential constructional element of normative consent be achieved.  There must be 
recognition that the complainant is aware that there was a risk of transmission of the 
disease.   
 
The Konzani judgment emphasised the importance of there being a balance 
between public policy and autonomy, and that is why a fully informed consent was 
utilised.97  It is, therefore, clear that the consent of the complainant is a defence to 
the reckless transmission of HIV. An approach of this type evidently denotes a soft 
paternalistic interpretation of the criminalisation of HIV. It is uncertain whether the 
disclosure of HIV status is sufficient for the defendant to rely upon the complainant 
consenting to the risk. In Dica,98 it was suggested that disclosing an HIV status 
sufficed, but Judge LJ provided conflicting dicta throughout the judgment.  Konzani 
appeared to imply that more was necessary.99 Numerous scholars have also 
identified that the crucial issue is what the complainant must ‘know’ to be able to 
provide a fully informed consent.100 The other important element is that implied 
consent has been enabled by Konzani, but the parameters have not been fully 
ascertained. It seems that what constitutes consent will need to be revisited by the 
judiciary.  The  English position on consent, as identified, may be  contrasted with 
the Canadian perspectives to identify synchronicity or otherwise with normative 
consent. 
 
The Canadian Judiciary And The Requirement Of Consent And Disclosure In 
HIV Transmission/Exposure Cases  
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. 
The current position, within the Canadian jurisdiction, is that consent to unprotected 
intercourse does not convey that that person has consented to unprotected 
intercourse with an HIV positive individual.101 There will only be a legally valid 
consent if the defendant, under certain conditions, discloses their status to the 
complainant; otherwise consenting to unprotected intercourse is considered to have 
been obtained by fraud.102 This does not take into account that the complainant may 
be unaware of the risk of the virus being transmitted. There is no obligation placed 
upon a defendant to disclose to any prospective sexual partner that there is a risk of 
virus being transmitted.103 It is assumed that the complainant would always be 
versed on the risks, and this may not be the case. Consent, in these circumstances 
may not transform into a fully informed consent.  
 
The Judicial Precepts Of Canada And The Disclosure/ Consent Requirement  
 
An agglomeration of appellate cases,104 before the Canadian Courts, have confirmed 
that there is no issue with the complainant consenting to unprotected intercourse 
with an HIV+ individual. It is when a defendant has to disclose their HIV status that 
has been the focus of the courts’ deliberations.  This quandary primarily surfaced in  
R v Cuerrier.105  The complainant (KM) had embarked upon an 18 month relationship 
with Cuerrier. Cuerrier had already tested positive for the virus before embarking 
upon the relationship.  At the beginning of the relationship Cuerrier and KM had 
discussed sexually transmitted diseases, but Cuerrier had specified that he had 
tested negative for HIV.106 Eventually, Cuerrier and the complainant were tested and 
Cuerrier was confirmed to be HIV positive. The complainant continued to have 
unprotected intercourse with him, but stated that the reason for this was so that he 
could not infect anyone else. Cuerrier then embarked upon a relationship with 
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another woman (BH) where he had unprotected intercourse without disclosing his 
sero-status. He was charged with two offences of aggravated assault in relation to 
KM and BH.107  
 
It was unequivocally confirmed that consent to unprotected intercourse did not 
signify consent to unprotected intercourse with an infected person.  It was 
unanimously confirmed that the fundamental issue that needed to be resolved in the 
case was whether the consent was obtained by fraud. The pre-Cuerrier position 
stipulated two types of fraud existed: fraud as to the act or fraud as to the person.108 
Both of these definitions had been removed from the Canadian Criminal Code.109 
This enabled the Court to sequentially extend the parameters of the law on fraud.110 
Each member of the court was prepared to extend the boundaries of fraud to 
encompass other circumstances.111 The majority proposed that fraud, within a 
commercial context, was analogous to the current situation.112 It would be 
considered to be fraud in this circumstance if the defendant did not disclose 
important facts, and thereby caused a ‘deprivation or risk of deprivation.’113 The 
defendant, not disclosing or concealing their HIV status, would constitute fraud.114 
Cory J stated that: 
 
“Without disclosure of HIV status there cannot be a true consent. The consent 
cannot simply be to have sexual intercourse. Rather it must be consent to have 
intercourse with a partner who is HIV-positive. True consent cannot be given if there 
has not been a disclosure by the accused of his HIV-positive status. A consent that 
is not based upon knowledge of the significant relevant factors is not a valid 
consent.’115 
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Cory J’s dictum is potentially contradictory. Throughout the judgment it is stated that 
disclosure of HIV status is the requirement, and then contrastingly proposes that 
there cannot be consent unless the complainant is aware of ‘significant relevant 
factors’. ‘Significant relevant factors’ indicate that an awareness of the risk is a 
necessary component that should be attributed to the complainant, and this would 
assist in that person being afforded the opportunity to provide an informed consent.  
An informed consent can be stated to be ‘informed, voluntary, and decisionally 
capacitated consent’,116 whereby  all the relevant facts have been disseminated. 
Anything devoid of these ‘significant relevant factors’ would denote that there was no 
legally valid consent.  Could or should ‘significant relevant factors’ be extended to 
the defendant enlightening the complainant about there being a risk of transmission?  
 
It appears that the judgment is interpreted so that disclosure of HIV status is the only 
requirement that is expected of the defendant. Once disclosure has taken place it 
may be deemed that the complainant is consenting to the ‘risk’ of infection. Basic 
disclosure does not connote that the complainant is consenting to running the risk of 
infection, but the court seems to impute that the complainant is consequently aware 
of the possibility of the virus being transmitted. There is a presumption that a 
complainant accepts the risks that are associated with sexual activity with an HIV+ 
individual.117 This is an acceptance of factual consent, and not necessarily normative 
consent. A complainant cannot be understood to have truly consented if they are 
oblivious to the risk that the activity may pose.118 The judgment suggests that all 
complainants will be fully conversant with the risks that are associated with having 
unprotected intercourse with an HIV+ individual, and fails to take into consideration 
the significant minority.119 It seems that factual consent takes precedence, thereby 
excluding normative consent in these situations.  It is conceded the awareness will 
not be relevant in all cases as the majority of individuals will be aware of the risk of 
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infection by having unprotected intercourse, but a significant minority are unaware of 
the modes of transmission.  
 
The use of basic disclosure as the threshold appears to transcend all Supreme Court 
decisions. The Supreme Court have reiterated on a number of occasions that 
disclosure of one’s status was the only requirement. In R v DC,120 it was inferred that 
basic disclosure would be sufficient to ascertain that the complainant consented.121 
An acceptance of basic disclosure as the requirement  cannot be assumed, as the 
Supreme Court in R v Mabior122 appear to acknowledge that a complainant may 
withhold their consent if they were aware of the risk of harm. In Mabior, the 
defendant was charged with nine counts of aggravated sexual assault. The language 
used by the Court  is at best convoluted: 
 
“Failure to disclose (the dishonest act) amounts to fraud where the complainant 
would not have consented had he or she known the accused was HIV-positive, and 
where sexual contact poses a significant risk of or causes actual serious bodily harm 
(deprivation).”123  
 
The dictum may have multiple interpretations. Firstly, that disclosure by the 
defendant is sufficient as it is stated the complainant would not have consented if 
they were aware of the defendant’s sero-status. Alternatively, if the complainant was 
aware they would not have partaken in activities that posed a risk of serious harm. It 
seems that it is the former that takes preference as it was again presumed 
throughout the judgment that an individual would be aware of the risk of the virus 
being transmitted by consenting to unprotected intercourse with an HIV+ individual.  
Yet it should be the latter that is preferred as it demonstrates that the complainant 
would need an awareness of the risk.  
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There has been no confirmation about the extent of informed consent. It has been 
presumed that disclosure, and acceptance of that disclosure, denotes that the 
complainant will be consenting to running the risk of infection. Grant124 presumes 
such a stance, but expresses that the complainant will always withhold their consent 
when the defendant’s HIV status is revealed to them: ‘It also assumes that the 
accused knows his or her HIV status and that his or her sexual partner will withhold 
consent once disclosure takes place.’ 125  
 
There can be no such assumption as all that is required is a basic disclosure. This 
signifies that consenting to intercourse with an HIV + individual is sufficient and 
consenting to the risk need not be taken into account. In these situations a 
complainant who is unaware of the risk will only be consenting to unprotected 
intercourse with an HIV+ individual. This perception may have been altered if a truly 
informed consent is required as there would be awareness that the virus could be 
transmitted.  The case law places the assessment of the risk onto the defendant, 
thereby excluding a complainant from any consultation on the matter, and this 
cannot be justified.  
 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada: Williams And An Implied Consent 
 
In R v Williams,126 the Supreme Court affirmed that a defence based upon an implied 
consent was not appropriate in HIV exposure/transmission cases. Here the 
defendant was charged with aggravated assault after he had infected an 
unsuspecting partner with the virus.  The basis of the appeal centred upon the timing 
of the infection, and whether the defendant had infected the complainant before he 
became aware that he had the virus. It was argued that an essential ingredient of the 
offence had not been made out, as Williams could not have endangered the life of 
the complainant as she may have already been infected.  It was held that a 
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conviction of aggravated assault was unattainable as the court stipulated that there 
was an inability to determine when the complainant became infected. The alternative 
charge of attempted aggravated assault could be upheld. It was confirmed that an 
absence of consent for actus reus purposes is evaluated subjectively from the 
complainant’s perspective.127 The court held that the complainant had not 
subjectively consented to having unprotected intercourse with an HIV+ individual, 
thereby excluding implied consent. It was clear that the Court were unwilling to 
extend the parameters of the defence of consent to encompass an implied consent. 
 
The court applied the definition of consent from R v Ewanchuk.128   In Ewanchuk, a 
case unrelated to HIV exposure, the defendant had been charged with sexual 
assault. It was the Crown’s case that the defendant had intimately touched the 
complainant on a number of occasions. Each time that the complainant said ‘no’ the 
defendant refrained from the conduct. He then persisted to a more serious assault 
where the complainant stated that any acquiescence was out of fear.  Ewanchuk  
argued a defence based upon implied consent, as it seemed to the defendant that 
the complainant had consented.  It was held that there was no defence of implied 
consent as a complainant either consents or they do not consent thereby 
emphasising the importance of subjectivity.129  
 
It is reasonable for the Court in Williams to follow the decision in Ewanchuk  as a 
defendant must disclose their HIV status when there is a significant risk of serious 
bodily.130 The onus is on the defendant to confirm that they have the virus. If implied 
consent were to be assessed from any point other than the complainant’s subjective 
state of mind, it could be cogently argued that a defendant would anticipate that the 
complainant had impliedly consented simply by engaging in unprotected intercourse. 
This would put the complainant in an onerous position, and would afford a defence to 
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individuals who did not consider it appropriate to disclose their status to prospective 
partners. 
 
The utilisation of the ratio in Ewanchuk,131 and, thus, the exclusion of  implied 
consent, has not been universally accepted.  Stewart132 distinguished the case from 
cases of HIV transmission/exposure as Ewanchuk did not stipulate that the decision 
should be applied to non-sexual offences, and Williams was charged with 
aggravated assault.133 Indeed, this may prove an accurate contention, but the court 
did not exclude the utilisation of its interpretation of consent to other offences.  The 
conclusive acceptance of the Ewanchuk approach can, and should, be relevant to 
any assault provisions134 as the fundamental issue that must be established is 
whether the complainant consented to the interference. This corresponds with the 
subjective nature of factual consent, and ensures that any acquiescence can begin 
to align to the fundamental elements of normative consent. 
 
An implied consent defence may still be envisaged if the defendant discloses their 
sero-status, and the complainant stipulates that they consented, but would not have 
consented if they were aware of the risks. In these circumstances the complainant 
would have consented to intercourse with an individual who is HIV+, being unaware 
of the risk of transmission by having intercourse. The current position is that the 
courts recognize that if an individual consents to intercourse with a person who is 
HIV+ then it is assumed that that individual accepts the risk.  This may be 
inadequate, in some circumstances, and will not always accord to normative 
consent, thereby connoting an implied consent.  
 
The current obfuscatory position of implied consent in extant Canadian law, and the 
palpable anomalies created, does not give the impression that this is the end of the 
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matter. Rawluck135 postulates that the decision of the Supreme Court in Mabior136 
resurrected implied consent. Here it was proposed that if disclosure is not required 
the complainant had effectively consented to partaking in intercourse with an 
individual who was HIV positive.137 It is stated that the decision, ‘fails to protect a 
person’s right to choose who to have sex with…’. 138    If that is a precise account 
then the equivalent could be promulgated in relation to the test that was originally set 
out in Cuerrier.139 Rawluck appears to promote L’Heureux-Dubé J’s development of 
the definitional construct of fraud, whereby total disclosure would be mandatory. This 
approach was unanimously excluded by  the judiciary in Mabior as the ‘net of 
culpability would be cast too wide’. 140  
 
Canada And The Judicial Preference Towards Factual Consent 
 
As has been demonstrated by the critical evaluation above, the tenets of Canadian 
law affords and promotes disclosure, and this forms the basis  of any defence to the 
charges that are presented.141 The jurisprudence from this jurisdiction facilitates a 
soft paternal inclination to this type of situation.  If sexual intimacy follows disclosure 
it equates to the complainant consenting to having unprotected intercourse with an 
HIV+ individual.142 This requisite level can be considered to be a basic disclosure as 
a defendant is only expected to  disclose their sero-status.    No dissemination of 
further information is anticipated as the judiciary presume that the complainant will 
always be aware of the risks associated with having unprotected intercourse with an 
HIV+ defendant.  The exclusion of implied consent  for actus reus purposes is to be 
welcomed as the subjective awareness of the complainant is the pre-eminent 
preference.143 It seems that a fully informed consent is secondary in Canada as 
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disclosure takes precedence, thereby denoting that in certain situations factual 
consent will suffice.   
 
The critique of Canadian law in relation to consent and HIV exposure/transmission 
has revealed discrepancies and confusion within extant doctrinal principles. Attention 
will now focus on consent and disclosure within the United States, and an 
examination of prevailing orthodoxy.  
 
Consenting To Unprotected Intercourse With An HIV+ Individual and  The 
Disclosure Of Ones’ Sero-Status Within The United States 
 
The Presidential Commission submitted that any States with specific criminal 
provisions should permit a defendant to be exculpated if they disclose their  HIV 
status to prospective sexual partners, and thereby  attain the consent of the 
complainant to run the risk of transmission.144 The majority of States, that are 
subsequently considered, have enacted legislation where disclosure or consent can 
exculpate the defendant. Disclosure, prima facie, is synonymous with consent as the 
majority of States have utilised either of these terms interchangeably.145 This has 
translated to an affirmation that a complainant has agreed to have unprotected 
intercourse with the defendant.  
 
Alternative State Approaches to Consent and Exposure To HIV: The Putative Search 
for Uniformity 
 
There are distinct advantages to utilising a specific statutory provision that authorises 
a defence based upon consensual activities with an HIV+ individual. States that have 
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enacted legislation that permits consent or a defendant to disclose their status have 
implemented a soft paternalistic legislative framework.146 Enabling such 
convergence may protect a fully informed complainant by facilitating them with the 
possibility of exercising their right to act autonomously.147  Indeed, a soft paternal 
model can be more meritorious than enacting hard paternalistic legislation.148 The 
restriction of the defendant’s opportunity to disclose, or retracting the complainant’s 
right to consent to unprotected intercourse, would unduly interfere with the sexual 
autonomy and reproductive autonomy of both individuals.149  
 
The allowance of a specific provision on HIV transmission/exposure necessitates 
legislative precision as this presumptively would ensure no contentious issues would 
subsequently ensue, and this may be why the MPC is vague on the matter. This 
‘precision’ cannot be seen within U.S. State law as there is no uniform approach to 
the defence of consent in exposure/transmission cases.  The provisions under 
consideration can be compartmentalised into three distinct considerations: currently, 
there are States that allow disclosure by the defendant to act as a defence;150 States 
that anticipate the consent of the complainant;151 and finally jurisdictions that have no 
express provision that exists in relation to consent or disclosure.152  The analysis will 
begin by a critique of the jurisdictions that require the defendant to disclose their 
status.  
 
U.S State Law That Requires The Defendant To Disclose Their Sero-Status 
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The disclosure statutes can be allocated into two categories.  At present, the majority 
of the specific legislatory provisions require disclosure of ones’ sero-status.153 A 
further provision imposes more extensive conditions that can require an 
establishment of the awareness of the risk on the part of the complainant.154 The 
following exposition will firstly focus upon States that expect the defendant to 
disclosure their sero-status.  
 
States That Require Basic Disclosure By The Defendant  
 
The statutory provisions of Arkansas,155 and California156 compel a defendant to 
disclose their sero-status to prospective sexual partners. There is a lack of clarity 
therein as to the requisite level of knowledge that the complainant must possess in 
order to make an informed decision.157 The only expectation is disclosure of HIV 
status on the part of a defendant. Therefore, there is no obligation placed upon the 
defendant to ensure that the complainant is aware of the risk associated with the 
activity that they are to partake in, and this may be considered to be a major flaw 
with the overarching statutory framework.  
 
Each of the relevant provisions under consideration stipulate that the defendant must 
inform the complainant that they have the virus.158 Thus, there is a presumption that 
any individual who consents to unprotected intercourse with a HIV+ individual 
consents to the risk of infection. This connotes that disclosure of HIV status is the 
threshold expectation: such informational dissemination may be termed a basic 
disclosure. A basic disclosure ignores any awareness by the complainant of the 
implications of having unprotected intercourse with an HIV + individual. 
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The Californian statutory provision ascribes a defendant with the opportunity to 
disclose their status.159 It is stated that: 
“(a) Any person who exposes another to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
by engaging in unprotected sexual activity when the infected person knows at the 
time of the unprotected sex that he or she is infected with HIV, has not disclosed 
his or her HIV-positive status, and acts with the specific intent to infect the other 
person with HIV, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state 
prison for three, five, or eight years.”160 (emphasis added) 
 
There is no elucidation as to the extent of the required disclosure, and it may be 
presumed, as a result of the terminology utilised within the section, that the 
defendant expressly stating that he has the virus will suffice for exculpatory 
inculcations. Intrinsically, all that is required is a basic disclosure, and this does not 
denote a fully informed consent. As previously observed, not all complainants will be 
conscious of the risk associated with unprotected intercourse161, and this should be a 
cause for concern. Currently, within California, there are no cases to substantiate the 
effectual interpretation of this provision, but this may be attributed to the overriding 
mens rea requirement of the section.162 
 
 
An incremental development of the determination of disclosure can be surveyed in 
Arkansas.163 The statutory provision instructs a carrier of the virus to ‘inform’ a 
potential sexual partner that they are HIV+.164 This connotes that once the 
complainant assents to intercourse, in the knowledge of the sero-status of the 
defendant, then the defendant cannot be accountable for exposing or transmitting 
the virus to that person. 
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The issue of disclosure has not been extensively explored in Arkansas. In  State v 
Weaver,165 a case heard in the Court of Appeals of Arkansas, an issue in relation to 
disclosure did arise. The prosecution relied upon third party evidence to ascertain 
that the defendant had been unwilling to disclose his sero-status.166 This evidence 
was adduced to rebut the defendant’s testimony. The third party specified that the 
defendant had informed him that he wanted to transmit the virus to as many people 
as possible.167 The Court held that there was no error by the judge for allowing the 
admission of this evidence. Although the case did not specifically address the issue 
of disclosure, and the parameters of factual or normative consent, it did denote that 
basic disclosure, and to a certain extent, factual consent, was the apposite level. By 
implication, it would seem that the extent of normative consent may be deficient in 
cases within Arkansas.  
 
 
Kaplan168 submits that the basic disclosure provisions are defective, and attention 
should focus on the awareness of risk.169 Allowing an enhancement of basic 
disclosure would correspond to the requirements of normative consent being fulfilled, 
on all occasions. This is all the more pertinent when there is a distinction to be drawn 
between consenting to unprotected intercourse with an HIV+ individual, and 
consenting to having unprotected intercourse that carries the risk of being infected 
with HIV.170 An enhanced disclosure would ameliorate any discrepancies in a  
provision by ensuring that a complainant was fully aware of the risk of consenting to 
intercourse with an HIV + individual. 
 
Ohio And A Quasi-Enhanced Disclosure 
 
 
This can be seen in Ohio where an alternative to basic disclosure is inserted into the 
statutory provision.171 It is evident that basic disclosure172  will suffice, but the 
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provision conjoins supplementary ingredients to ensure that a complainant is fully 
alert to the circumstances.173 It is a condition that is activated if a complainant lacks 
the ‘mental capacity’ to be able to consent to the risks that can be associated with 
unprotected intercourse with an HIV+ individual.174 This infers that a fully informed 
consent is essential in all instances, and signifies that it is the capacity rather than 
the knowledge of the complainant that is relevant to normative consent. The 
provision still denotes that knowledge of the risk is relevant, as the assessment of 
the complainant’s ‘mental capacity’ can be assessed subjectively or objectively. This 
obliquely places the onus onto the defendant that in some cases he may need to 
seek clarification that the complainant understands the implications of sexual contact 
with an HIV+ individual.175  This provision can been seen to some extent to reinforce 
the importance of normative consent as an essential component that empowers a 
complainant to provide a fully informed consent. 
 
The use of disclosure  as the requisite threshold has received judicial examination. In 
State v Gonzalez, a case heard at the Court of Appeals of Ohio, the defendant 
contended, inter alia, that the statute was vague, and that there was no definition of 
disclosure within the provision.176 The court disregarded the argument and held that 
disclosure should be given its ordinary English dictionary meaning, and that verbal 
disclosure of the defendant’s status would be adequate.177  The approach, endorsed 
by the court, equiparated and balanced the position of the disclosure defence as the 
English meaning is relatively undemanding, and basic disclosure, can and will, be 
sufficient if the conditions permit this to be appropriate.178 Unfortunately, there no 
assessment of the enhanced provisions of the statute.  Minahan179 submits there are 
still prevailing issues, and the definition of disclosure has not been tested by other 
appellate courts.180 It seems that the court were satisfied with using the ordinary 
literal meaning that was attributed to ‘disclosure’ as no further appeal was pursued. 
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The more contentious issue would be ascertaining whether a complainant had the 
capacity to fully understand the implications of unprotected intercourse with an HIV+ 
individual. 
 
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that the identified States have not 
implemented any standardised approach to the requirement of disclosure. The 
preponderance of the jurisdictions examined require basic disclosure as the 
threshold for exculpation purposes. This does not imply that basic disclosure is the 
most apposite method. It is Ohio that exclusively anticipates that there may be 
occasions where basic disclosure will be deficient.  
 
Tierney181 proposes that disclosure alone does not establish a fully informed 
consent: ‘consent by the partner after full disclosure of the risks associated with the 
activity should be a defense.’182 To acquire this requisite threshold there would need 
to be amplification of the risk of  transmission via sexual contact.183  Further 
endorsement of an enhanced legislative framework originates from MacArthur184 
who proposes that basic disclosure does not encapsulate all culpable behaviours 
and is ‘underbreadth’ as an unaccompanied basic disclosure would not furnish the 
complainant with essential information to determine the risk of transmission. 185 This 
may not allow a complainant to make an informed choice of whether to consent to 
the risk of the virus being transmitted, but this would not always be the case. 
McGuire186 also questions basic disclosure provisions as they protect the defendant, 
and suggests that  a fully informed consent should be the requisite approach to 
protect the complainant by ensuring that they have a sufficient awareness of the 
circumstances.187 As previously stated, in order for the complainant to fully consent 
they must have all of the relevant facts disclosed to them and this may include an 
                                            
181 Thomas W. Tierney, ‘Criminalizing the Sexual Transmission of HIV: An International Analysis (1992) 15 Hastings International and 
Comparative Law Review 475 
182 ibid, 512 
183 ibid, 498  
184 James B. McArthur, ‘As the Tide Turns: The Changing HIV/AIDS Epidemic and the Criminalization of HIV Exposure’ (2009) 94 
Cornell Law Review 707, 
185 ibid, 735-6 
186 Amy L. McGuire, ‘Comment: Aids as a Weapon: Criminal Prosecution of HIV Exposure’ 36 Houston Law Review 1787 
187 ibid, 1803 -04 
33 
 
explanation that there is a risk of transmission.188Having considered the disclosure 
provision It is now appropriate to evaluate legislation that has specified that the 
consent of the complainant will be the basis of a defence. 
 
State Statutory Provisions That Require The Consent Of The Complainant  
 
There are a number of States that have enacted soft paternalistic legislation. The 
provisions enable the defendant to evade liability if the complainant consents to 
having intercourse with that person knowing that they are HIV+, and that they will be 
exposed to the virus. It is evident that the requirement of these statutes is a fully 
informed consent. This can, and does, form the basis to ascertain whether the 
conditions of normative consent have been fulfilled. Lucidity prevails as the 
provisions denote that the complainant must be fully aware of the defendant having 
the virus, and also of the risk of the virus being transmitted through sexual contact. 
McGuire acknowledged that an informed consent may include an awareness of 
risk,189 and proposes that: 
 
“…an effective HIV statute should include a defense of informed consent. The 
defendant should have to prove that she adequately informed her partner of her HIV 
infection and that her partner subsequently consented to engage in the high risk 
conduct.”190 
 
A truly informed consent should envisage an individual having the opportunity to 
assess the circumstances by being furnished with all of the facts.191 The extent of 
those facts may need to include the risk of transmission. Only then can the threshold 
for normative consent be fulfilled. An informed consent of this magnitude could 
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correspond to the MPC definition of consenting to a risk being reasonably 
foreseeable, but that section does not ordinarily address sexual activity, instead 
focusing on non-fatal offences.192  Enabling an efficiently constructed foundation for 
informed consent may promote disclosure as the defendant would be fully aware of 
the expectations of the statutory provision. Exculpation would follow if the defendant 
informs the complainant of their HIV status and that unprotected sexual intercourse 
runs the risks of becoming infected.  
 
These states193 perceive that a basic disclosure will be defective, and that 
supplementary conditions are essential for there to be a fully informed consent. Such 
a provision, by way of illustration, is contained within Illinois’ Penal Code. It is stated 
that: 
“it is an affirmative defense that the person exposed knew the infected person was 
HIV positive, knew the action could result in infection, and consented with that 
knowledge.” 194 
 
The provision is lucid to the extent that an informed consent is the requirement. 
Nevertheless, the terminology attributed to the provision raises a number of 
impediments that must be overcome for a defendant to rely upon the complainant’s 
consent.195 The complainant must know that the defendant is infected. There is no 
indication as to how the complainant could acquire that knowledge. Would such 
revelations have to emerge from the defendant or can that information emanate from 
a third party, for example the defendant’s mother? Any information emanating from a 
third party may connote that the defendant can rely upon an implied consent, and 
this has not been scrutinised within the jurisdiction. 
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The second limb is more ambiguous. What is meant by “action”? Does this denote 
the type of sexual activity? Logically it can be presumed that it would relate to the 
sexual activities that are described within the statute. Once the awareness of these 
linguistic obstacles have been overcome, can a complainant give consent?  The 
language that is used in this provision evidently stipulates that the complainant must 
give a fully informed consent. They must be fully aware of all of the facts and 
anything devoid of this will not suffice. There has been no exploration of the defence 
of consent by the appellate court of Illinois, to assist clarification of interpretative 
difficulties. In 1990, Herman196 prophetically stated that the Illinois provision was 
sufficiently robust to survive judicial scrutiny because of the availability of the 
defence of consent.197  
 
The requirement of a fully informed consent can be surveyed within other statutory 
provisions. In Missouri’s statute it is stated that a defendant will have a defence if a 
prospective partner has knowledge and consents to being exposed to the virus.198 
An exposition of knowledge and consent excludes consent in isolation. It can be 
surmised that knowledge denotes the complainant being fully aware of the defendant 
having the virus, and with the knowledge that they will be exposed to the virus.  In 
this context, the complainant will be making an informed choice, and this conforms to 
normative consent. In State v Wilson,199 a case concerning statutory rape and other 
offences, the Supreme Court of Missouri Court confirmed that the statute stipulates 
that a defendant must disclose their status to any individual who they are planning 
on having intercourse with, but there was no elaboration as to raising that person’s 
awareness of risk.200  
 
The ‘type’ of consent has been confirmed before the appellate courts in Missouri to 
exclude an implied consent. In State v Yonts,201 the complainant testified that she 
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had heard rumours of the defendant having the virus and that the defendant had 
denied the assertions. The fact that she may have been aware of the defendant’s 
status prior to any intimacy was not considered, and infers that an implied consent is 
irrelevant within this State. The disregard of the potential awareness of the 
complainant is obvious, as the statutory provision connotes that knowledge within 
the context of normative consent is required, and an implied consent does not 
achieve this gradation. It was confirmed by the Appellate Court that a defendant 
commits the offence if he exposes a sexual partner to the virus without their 
knowledge or consent at the time of the contact,202 thereby implying that disclosure 
must emanate from the defendant. The unfortunate incidental effect of the decision is 
that intricacies of ‘knowledge’ were not explored, and there was no clarity as to the 
complainant’s ‘awareness’ of the risk of the virus being transmitted. 
 
Washington And The Lack Of Legislative Clarity  
Other jurisdictions do not expicilately state that consent or disclosure can act as a 
defence. One such state is Washington where the legislative template vis-à-vis HIV 
exposure is demarcated by the omission of any particularised section identifying a 
specific defence predicated upon disclosure or consent.203 It may be assumed that 
the consent of the complainant to sexual intimacy with an HIV+ individual is 
irrelevant for culpability purposes.  This exclusion of consent or disclosure, by the 
legislator, would denote that the State has acceded to a hard paternalistic legislative 
framework.  The concerning element of this type of provision is that it indicates that a 
defendant may be expected to embark upon a life of abstinence from unprotected 
intercourse.  The criminal provision of Washington has received societal 
endorsement, but negatively precludes fully consenting partners. Weiss submits that: 
 
“Virginia's and Washington's statutes, then, are the only statutes that are designed 
so that they criminalize the "gift-giving"/"bug-chasing" phenomenon while not 
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criminalizing accidental transmission of HIV between an HIV-positive partner and an 
informed partner.”204 
 
Weiss assumes that a defendant would not be accountable if their prospective 
partner was ‘informed’. The assertion is problematic as there is nothing that can be 
extracted from the provision that specifies that there can be a defence of consent or 
disclosure. The vacuity of the provision may impinge upon a defendant who 
anticipated that the consent of a complainant would have been a  defence. The 
absence of any expressly stated constructional definition of  consent or disclosure is 
concerning. It implies that the defendant would be unable to rely upon consent, even 
if it was a purely voluntary sexual interaction with a fully informed complainant acting 
autonomously, and an individual’s rights are potentially rendered nugatory.  
 
The appellate cases, within Washington, may have presented some conciliation to 
patrons of a soft paternalistic inclination.205 In State v Ferguson,206 a case heard in 
the Court of Appeals of Washington, the complainant had consented to protected 
intercourse in the knowledge that the defendant was HIV+. On the third occasion,  
the complainant stated that the defendant removed the condom without her 
knowledge, thereby vitiating the consent to protected intercourse.  The defendant 
appealed, inter alia, on the basis that he should have been given the opportunity to 
raise the defence of consent.207 This provided the court with the means to clarify the 
parameters of consent, but the appellate court imparted conflicting statements on 
whether the consent of the complainant can act as a defence in exposure cases. It 
was first postulated that the Court would not clarify whether the defence could be 
utilised.208  The Court then proceeded to demonstrate, through case law, that 
consent can act as a defence, but declined to elaborate on whether consent could be 
an appropriate mechanism for exculpation in  HIV cases.209 It was assumed by the 
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Court, but they would not hold, that consent may be the basis of a defence in these 
cases.210  The Court refused to do so as the defence of consent was deemed to be 
irrelevant to the case that was before the them.211Thus, the parameters of factual 
consent or normative consent were not fully explored.  
 
State v Whitfield,212 provided incremental guidance on the utilisation of a defence of 
consent in Washington. In Whitfield, the defendant was charged with multiple assault 
charges, having had unprotected intercourse on a number of occasions.213 It was 
proposed that the defendant, by ‘deliberately concealing his HIV status’ assisted the 
prosecution in determining that he was acting with intent. 214  The judgment did not 
expressly stipulate that the defence may be available, but implied that disclosure or 
consent may assist in exonerating a defendant as intent is an essential ingredient of 
the offence.215 The Court did provide some clarification by stating that there can be 
no consent unless the complainant is fully aware of the defendant’s HIV status, but 
declined to confirm that it may form the basis of a defence to such a charge.216 This 
may still be seen to have strengthened the utilisation of the defence, but the Court 
did not expressly stipulate any amplification on the requisites for a valid consent, 
thereby excluding any discourse on the awareness of the risk.   
 
The Distinct Approaches to Disclosure and Consent Within The United States 
 
A multitude of U.S. States have enacted a soft paternalistic legislative framework to 
the criminalisation of HIV transmission/exposure.  There is a clear distinction 
between provisions that require disclosure, and those that necessitate the consent of 
the complainant. The legislative provisions that require disclosure appear to denote a 
more basic approach.  In the majority of those provisions, the defendant is obliged  
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to disclose their sero-status, and this alone will be considered  adequate for 
exculpation purposes.217 Basic disclosure is deficient, as not every complainant will 
appreciate the potential severity of the situation.218 For example, they may not be 
fully conversant to the risk of the virus being transferred through unprotected 
intercourse. This is only identified, within their disclosure provisions, by the State of  
Ohio, where the complainant must be aware of the risks to be able to provide a fully 
informed consent.219 
 
The provisions220 that require the consent of the complainant are more translucent 
than those that express disclosure. Each of those statutes necessitate an awareness 
of the defendant’s HIV status that is conditional upon the complainant consenting to 
the risk of becoming infected with the virus. The provisions acknowledge that 
potential complainants are informed of the risk of the virus being transmitted, but fail 
to recognise that the majority of defendants would already be aware. The appellate 
cases within these indentified jurisdictions have not explored the provisions that 
expressly stated that the complainant must be aware the risk of infection, as the 
wording of the statute seems to be taken as a given. Beyond these particularised 
legal system approaches it is necessary to articulate a comparative juxtaposition of 
the extant law, to establish the similarities and differences in the approach to 
consent, and present preferred reform pathways.  
 
A Cross-Jurisdictional Analysis Of The Defences Of Consent And Disclosure 
 
It is evident from the aforementioned discussion that consent may negate otherwise 
culpable conduct.  Allowing the defence of consent is advantageous for two reasons.  
It can, if the conditions permit, enable the complainant to make an informed choice 
and respect that individual’s autonomy. The utilisation of the defence can also 
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encourage a defendant to act in a responsible manner.  By permitting consent, the 
majority of the jurisdictions considered have implemented a soft paternalistic 
approach to criminalising such proclivity. It is generally accepted that providing that 
the complainant is aware of the defendant’s sero-status then there is a freedom to 
run the risk of becoming infected. This does not imply that there has been a uniform 
approach to consent. The utilisation of the defence does not denote that all of the 
jurisdictions specify the extent of the information that the defendant needs to 
disseminate for the defence to be fully operational.  There are divergent approaches 
to the expectation of disclosure within the jurisdictions. 
 
The Contrasting Levels Of Disclosure Within The Legal Systems Levels of 
Disclosure 
 
The extent of the disclosure requirement is a crucial determinant that has received 
limited judicial or legislative scrutiny, and significant distinctions in this important 
respect can be drawn between England, Canada and the various U.S. State laws. 
The divergent levels of disclosure, and therefore consent, can be compartmentalised 
into three distinct groups:  there are those jurisdictions that require basic 
disclosure;221 a quasi-enhanced disclosure;222 and/or an enhanced disclosure.223 A  
basic disclosure compels the defendant to divulge that they have the virus, 
advocated and identified within the Canadian jurisdiction.224 The quasi-enhanced 
provision expects the defendant to disclose their sero-status, but the provision may 
exclude a defence of basic disclosure if the complainant is unaware of the risk of 
becoming infected and this is the approach that is adopted within the State of 
Ohio.225 The final alternative is an enhanced disclosure template that obliges the 
defendant to disclose their HIV status, and that there is a risk of infection being 
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transmitted.226 It is an altered quasi-enhanced model that is the preferred approach 
herein, and further reflective considerations in this regard are subsequently iterated.   
 
An Analysis Of The Criminal Justice Systems That Require Basic Disclosure 
 
As discussed above, the development of basic disclosure does not anticipate the 
defendant professing anything other than that they have the virus. This ‘basic’ 
disclosure is undemanding, and there are distinct advantages to allowing limited 
information to be disseminated. The requirement is relatively simple to adhere to, 
and it is unproblematic for the defendant and the complainant to substantiate that the 
relevant information had been communicated to the complainant, although in 
practice this can be a contentious issue, as previously stated.227   
 
The English jurisdiction provides conflicting dicta on the utilisation of basic 
disclosure, and equiparation with more straitened enhanced disclosure.228 There is 
too much emphasis placed within the leading judgments on the complainant having 
the ‘opportunity’ to make an informed choice.229 There is obfuscation as to how a 
complainant would be able to cognitively formulate an informed choice.  In Dica,230 it 
was  inferred that a basic disclosure was the appropriate method of informing a 
complainant.231 It was presumed that once disclosure had transpired the complainant 
would know of the risks.232 A contradictory illustration of this essential requirement is 
provided within the judgment of Judge LJ in Dica, postulating a scenario where the 
risk may be concealed, and that a complainant may not be consenting to that risk.233  
The position is further convoluted by Konzani,234 whereby Judge LJ stipulates that a 
complainant should be aware of the risks, and alternatively that the complainant can 
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acquire the information from other sources.235 The former denoting an enhanced 
disclosure whilst the later demonstrates a basic disclosure. 
 
In complete contrast with the English precedential vacillations, there is clarity 
surrounding basic disclosure in a number of jurisdictions within the United States, 
notably Arkansas236and  California.237 It is expressly stipulated that basic disclosure 
is the threshold requirement as the defendant is obligated to inform the prospective 
partner that they have the virus.238 The advantage of those particularised legal 
systems is that the provisions are unambiguous, provide certainty and a simplistic 
standardisation.  The counterpoise is that the doctrinal difficulties that England faces 
are still operative, as it fails to denote that not all complainants will be able to make a 
fully informed decision.  
 
The Canadian juridical precepts are similar to the aforementioned jurisdictions. 
However, the jurisprudence is unique and, therefore, paradoxically distinct to the 
U.S. States that require basic disclosure to consensual activity and the English 
position.239 Prima facie, the leading judgments endorse basic disclosure by 
expecting the defendant to disclose their sero-status to the complainant.240 This 
jurisdiction is dissimilar as disclosure of one’s status is only required  when there is a 
‘significant risk of harm’ that poses a ‘realistic possibility’ of the virus being 
transmitted.241 The judiciary have endeavoured to provide guidance on when 
disclosure is required, but this is not extensive.242 It seems that the onus is on the 
defendant to evaluate the level of risk, and thereby excludes any consultation with 
the unsuspecting partner. This inculcates that the defendant is aware of the risk of 
the virus being transmitted, but the complainant may still be oblivious to that fact, 
thereby connoting that basic disclosure is the requirement. 
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Basic disclosure denotes that factual consent will be achieved, but there is no 
certainty that normative consent will always be attained. As previously noted, a 
significant minority of individuals seem to be unaware that the virus can be 
transmitted through unprotected intercourse.243 If one in five are uninformed as to the 
risk, it would signify that normative consent cannot be achieved on all occasions. If 
there is factual consent, but no consensus ad idem in terms of normative consent, 
then consent in a strict legal sense, cannot be fulfilled. There cannot be a fully 
informed consent. Any legislative framework must ensure that the constructional 
definitional elements of an acute awareness of the actual risk, on the part of the 
complainant are not only satisfied in practice, but reflected in new legislation. 
 
Ohio And The Quasi-Enhanced Disclosure Model  
 
Ohio appears to recognise a quasi-enhanced disclosure equipoise.244 The provision 
affords for a basic disclosure that will assist in exonerating a defendant.245 It does 
not anticipate that a basic disclosure will always provide a defence to the charge. 
Accordingly, there is also an inbuilt mechanism whereby basic disclosure will not 
suffice if the defendant becomes aware of, or ought to be aware that, the 
complainant is lacking the mental capacity to understand the risk associated with 
having unprotected sexual intercourse with an HIV+ individual.246 The provision 
invariably is concerned with capacity of the complainant rather than their knowledge, 
but in that circumstance it may still equate to an enhanced disclosure.  The 
obligation to enhance that disclosure would come to prominence if a defendant 
became aware that the complainant did not understand that there are risks 
associated with unprotected intercourse with an HIV+ individual.247 This provision 
has the benefit of the simplification of basic disclosure where it can be ascertained 
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that the complainant has provided a fully informed consent, that also embraces 
factual and normative elements of consent. It facilitates further disclosure when the 
complainant would otherwise be providing a legally deficient consent, as articulated 
above.  
 
The provision augments any jurisdictional inclinations towards basic disclosure as it 
has the potential to take into account the ‘significant minority’.248 The statute appears 
to focus upon the capacity of the complainant, rather than requisite knowledge of 
risk, but still implies that an enhanced disclosure may need to be expressed. There 
is an acceptance that the majority of individuals will be conscious of the risks. 
Furthermore, the constructional definitional elements of a fully informed consent are 
attained as the juncture of factual and normative consent could be absolute in all 
incidences of exposure. The soft paternal preferences of the provision permit the 
complainant’s autonomy to be preserved on all occasions. A statute of this type 
should be welcomed, but the ‘mental capacity’ criterion should be superseded with 
an awareness of risk requirement on the part of the complainant. As this paper is 
based upon a subjective awarenesss of the defendant  there are also concerns  with 
facilitating an objective test for fact finder determination.   
 
The Legal Systems That Expect An Enhanced Disclosure On All Occasions 
 
Specific legislation that facilitates enhanced disclosure has taken a number of forms, 
and presented distinctive lexicon constructs as potential exemplars for other legal 
systems to follow.249  All of the highlighted enhanced disclosure templates emanate 
from the United States.  They provide a more restrictive facility for the defence of 
consent to operate, and  a  more constrained exculpatory pathway, as there is an 
expectation that demands significantly more than disclosure of an individual’s sero-
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status. Each State250 has enacted supplementary formulae that must be adhered to 
for the defendant’s conduct to negate culpability.  
 
All of these provisions place emphasis on the complainant having the opportunity to 
fully consent to the particular activity. In Illinois it is specified that disclosure 
anticipates more than the defendant divulging their status.251 For a fully informed 
consent of this persuasion there must be dissemination of HIV status and attendant 
risk.252  There are ambiguities as to what would equate to an ‘action’ but it may be 
presumed that the provision is referring to sexual activity. It would have been 
beneficial to have express wording to that effect within the provision.  
.The provisions in a number of U.S. States specify that the complainant must be 
aware of more than the defendant’s status for the defence of consent to be 
activated.253 The same cannot be iterated in English law where there is no 
conformity within the leading appellate judgments. It is not apparent whether a basic 
or enhanced disclosure will suffice for operation of the defence.  Judicial precepts 
are opaque and are delineated more by mud rather than crystal. In Konzani,254 for 
instance, there seems to be focus on enhanced disclosure as there is an 
acknowledgement that the complainant must be aware that there are risks 
associated with unprotected intercourse with an HIV+ defendant.255 Unfortunately, 
there was no expansion of whether this should form a prospective template, and 
there are elements of Dica and Konzani that confusingly refer to basic disclosure as 
the touchstone.256 In those circumstances, it seems that it was presumed that the 
risks would be common knowledge. Further elucidation of the  expectations of 
disclosure, as has transpired with the legislative provisions  in the U.S. States that  
express ‘consent’ as the requirement, would provide clarification to domestic extant 
law.    
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There are certain impracticalities associated with facilitation of an enhanced 
disclosure template.  Respective U.S. States infer that all complainants would be 
unaware of the risks that can be associated with unprotected intercourse with an 
HIV+ individual. It has been affirmed that four out of every five individuals are aware 
that the virus can be transmitted through unprotected sexual intercourse.257 It is not 
necessary to expect an enhanced disclosure on all occasions. If such a proposition 
is adopted, the onus is on the defendant to ‘educate’ the complainant on all 
occasions. This may be too burdensome a requirement for the operation of the 
defence. What would the defendant need to inform the complainant about? If this is 
the case then would the defendant need to be a statistician, or provide a portfolio of 
the substantive risks of transmission before a fully informed consent can be 
obtained? A preferred option would be to simply inform the complainant that they 
may risk becoming infected if they have unprotected intercourse with an HIV+ 
individual. There should be nothing else that needs to be disseminated by a 
defendant for the operation of the defence.    
 
If disclosure is required then it must be a basic disclosure, unless it is obvious that 
the complainant does not appreciate that there is a risk that the virus may be 
transmitted. Anything more would be too onerous on the defendant. If there is to be a 
statutory provision on whether disclosure/consent can act as a defence then it needs 
to be constructed in this manner, reflecting the operative equipoise that has been 
highlighted in consideration of the review of comparative principles. 
 
The Utilisation of Factual Consent Within The Jurisdictions 
 
Whether the complainant has factually consented is obvious within all of the 
expectation levels of disclosure. The most disconcerting element is that factual 
consent is the prerequisite for basic disclosure. This cannot, and should not, be the 
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case as a fully informed consent consists of two elements: factual consent and 
normative consent.258  If the complainant has only factually consented can they be 
said to have the applicable information to formulate an informed choice to run the 
risk of the virus being transmitted? An individual may have the desire to have 
unprotected intercourse with an HIV+ individual, but not have the appropriate 
awareness to authorise unprotected intercourse that runs the risk of the virus being 
transmitted. It must be reiterated that this will not be the situation in all cases as the 
majority of complainants will be fully conversant with the risks associated with 
unprotected intercourse with a person who has the virus.  
 
England, Canada and a number of  U.S. States’ Penal Codes place emphasis on 
factual consent without true consideration of normative consent. This approach is 
devoid of rationality as the complainant who is unaware of the risk of transmission 
can never be said to have truly consented. Although they may have stipulated that 
they have agreed to intercourse with an individual who is HIV+, that is deficient for 
normative consent. The complainant must have agreed to intercourse with an HIV+ 
individual with the knowledge that there is a risk of the virus being transmitted. 
Beyleveld259 suggests that there can be no informational deficiencies if the defendant 
discloses their status. This neglects to take into consideration that a complainant 
may be unaware of the risks associated with unprotected intercourse with an HIV+ 
individual. It is also contrary to what Beyleveld  had previously advocated when 
stipulating that to have knowledge and understanding the complainant’s acceptance 
must be within their field of awareness.260 The latter proposal is the most appropriate 
as this conveys the significance of normative consent and rejects factual consent as 
the requisite threshold that the former proposition promotes.  
 
The Utilisation of Normative Consent Within The Jurisdictions 
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In each jurisdiction basic disclosure pervades factual consent. However, not every 
circumstance that necessitates basic disclosure adheres to the proposed working 
definition of a fully informed consent.  It is normative consent that is deficient as the 
‘significant minority’ would not have the requisite knowledge to acquiesce to 
unprotected intercourse.261 A complainant  must have  the apposite levels of 
awareness that acknowledge that the defendant is HIV+ and that unprotected 
intercourse may result in the virus being transmitted. This would ensure that that 
individual is proficient to be able to make an informed decision that may affect their 
health and welfare. Only when factual and normative consent have been met may it 
be determined that the complainant has truly consented. This can be seen in a 
number of jurisdictions in the United States, but there is no clarification of normative 
consent in England and Canada. 
 
Canada And England: The Utilisation Of Implied Consent 
 
A further issue that needs to be addressed is the utilisation of an implied consent. 
The acceptance of an implied consent within extant English judicial precepts is akin 
to proclaiming that normative consent is irrelevant. The Canadian courts have gone 
to great lengths to exclude implied consent by adopting the jurisprudence that was 
set out in Ewanchuk,262 and ensuring that it applied to all forms of assault.263  This 
does not indicate  that there has been an acceptance of the exclusion of an implied 
consent within Canada. Rawluck264 identified that, following the decision in 
Mabior,265 an implied consent transpires when there is no realistic possibility of 
transmission of the virus as the choice of whether to have intercourse with a HIV+ 
individual is removed from the complainant.266 An allowance of this magnitude would 
anticipate disclosure on all occasions, even when there was no risk of the virus being 
transmitted. The exclusion of an implied consent in Canada is in complete contrast to 
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how the law has developed in England where the decision in Konzani267 indicated 
that implied consent may be an available defence.268 
 
 In the majority of the U.S. States it can safely be assumed that consent must be an 
informed consent and that an implied consent would be deficient as the onus is on 
the defendant to disclose their status.   Can there ever be an implied consent if the 
requirement of the statutory provision is enhanced disclosure? It appears that this 
cannot be the case. In Missouri, the court appeared to be unwilling to accept that the 
complainant may have acquired the knowledge from a third party.269 In State v 
Yonts,270the complainant testified that they had heard that the defendant had the 
virus but the court deemed such knowledge irrelevant. This denotes that implied 
consent is irrelevant, and follows the Canadian approach to this type of consent. A 
complainant cannot be said to have consented to the risk of transmission just 
because they had received information from a third party. The threshold requirement 
of a fully informed consent, and for that matter, normative consent, has not been 
satisfied in such a postulated hypothecate.   
 
An Optimal Pathway To Ensure That Normative Consent Is Achieved On All 
Occasions  
 
The respective jurisdictions have all endorsed consent or disclosure as a defence to 
the criminal transmission/exposure to  HIV.  It is the U.S. State provisions that 
anticipate more than a basic disclosure, and these provide real clarity of what 
equates to a fully informed consent.  This does not denote that all of these statutes 
can be considered as the appropriate legislative framework. The statutes that require 
an enhanced disclosure fail to take into account that the majority of individuals will 
always be aware of the risk of the virus being transmitted; this should not be the 
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appropriate threshold. A more suitable legal construct is a quasi-enhanced 
disclosure. This acknowledges that there are individuals who are unaware of the 
risks associated with unprotected intercourse. If such a situation arises, then the 
onus is on the defendant to inform that person that there is a risk of the virus being 
transmitted. 
 
If there is to be a de novo legislative framework it is pertinent to assume that it 
should endeavour to provide a detailed extrapolation of how a fully informed consent 
can be attained. The suggested provision below  corresponds with  Robinson’s 
proposal  that criminal law defences can be compartmentalised into five categories, 
and that consent may be considered to be a defence that is within the ambit of 
‘offence modification’ or ‘failure of proof’.271  The offence modification defence 
denotes that all elements of the offence have been completed and that the defence 
of consent is independent of the offence.272  Failure of proof denotes that, ‘all of 
elements of the offence have not been proven’.273 Clause 1 (1) of  the proposed 
offence  denotes that consent would act as an offence modification defence as all 
elements of the offence would be satisfied, but the defendant should not be 
accountable as the complainant would be aware of the defendants status.274 Clause 
1(2) of the proposed offence denotes that consent cannot act as a defence to that 
charge. A suggested provision should embrace the complainant’s opportunity to 
provide a fully informed consent, and may resemble the recommended provision that 
is set out below: 
 
1. It is a defence to a criminal charge of the transmission of HIV that the 
complainant consented to running the risk of acquiring the virus. For that 
person to consent to running the risk of acquiring the virus: 
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(1)The defendant must disclose that he has the virus; 
(2)That disclosure must take place before any unprotected sexual activity; 
(3) The defendant must only partake in that activity if following disclosure he is 
confident that his prospective partner is aware that there is a risk that the virus 
may be transmitted 
3. It is for the prosecution to establish that the complainant did not consent  
4. Consent will not act as a defence if the defendant intended to transmit the virus or 
the complainant desired that he acquire the virus from that person.  
 
The recommended statutory provision promotes consent as a defence to the charge 
of criminal transmission of HIV. It compels the defendant to furnish prospective 
sexual partners with all of the relevant facts before that person can acquiesce to 
unprotected sexual intercourse.  Subsection (1) stipulates basic disclosure is the 
minimum pre-requisite.  It is anticipated that basic disclosure would be sufficient in 
the majority of cases, and thus will fulfil the expectations of factual and normative 
consent. Subsection (2) confirms that the disclosure must take place before any 
restricted intimate acts. This is an essential provision as it prevents any ambiguity as 
to the timing of the disclosure.  It is logical to presume that it must occur before any 
intimate acts as retrospective consent is normally precluded within the criminal law, 
and would be undesirable in this area. 
 
Subsection (3) is reliant in part upon Ohio’s provision as this quasi-enhanced 
disclosure template conflates basic and enhanced disclosure. The suggested 
statutory provision necessitates further disclosure when it becomes apparent to the 
defendant that the complainant is unaware of the risk of the virus being transmitted, 
thereby encompassing a subjective analysis at that juncture.275 The onus is on the 
defendant to explicate the relevant information. He would not be expected to go into 
the intricacies of the risks involved as this would be too onerous a task. An obligated 
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defendant would, however, be expected to stipulate that there may be a risk that the 
virus can be transmitted. It is imperative that this section is inserted as it fulfils the 
obligation of normative consent, particularly as statistical information signifies that 
one in five do not understand that the virus can be transmitted via unprotected 
heterosexual intercourse.276 The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to 
establish lack of consent as any other requirement would unduly evade issues in 
relation to the right to a fair trial,277 and the presumption of innocence. 278 The final 
element ensures that defendants who are intent on transmitting the virus would not 
be able to rely upon a consenting complainant. This would also denote that ‘bug 
chasers’ could not consent to running the risk of the virus being transmitted as the 
impacted issue is constitutionally an affront to public policy imperatives in this 
substantive arena.279 
 
The provision would ensure that the complainant has had adequate opportunity to 
assess whether they desire to participate in unprotected intercourse with a HIV+ 
individual whilst knowing that there are risks involved. This does not denote that 
consent or disclosure may be the only defence that is available to HIV+ individuals.  
A defendant using a condom, partaking in low risk activities or having a undetectable 
viral load may also act as potential defences.280  
 
Concluding Remarks: A Consent Must Be  A Fully Informed Consent 
 
 
The judicial precepts in England did not clarify the extant circumstances of a fully 
informed consent.  A defendant disclosing their status was deemed to be an 
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adequate disclosure. This reinforced the presumption that the extant position in 
England was more inclined to factual consent than normative consent. The 
inspection of Canada and America identified that there was no uniform approach to 
consent.  There were three distinct methods adopted by legislators and the judiciary: 
basic; quasi-enhanced; and enhanced disclosure. It was found that a number of 
jurisdictions had adopted an approach that necessitated the defendant disclosing 
their HIV status before the complainant would partake in unprotected sexual 
intercourse. Other jurisdictions had approached the issue by anticipating that 
disclosure of ones’ sero-status may be sufficient, but there may be circumstances 
whereby the defendant may need to inform their prospective sexual partner of the 
risk of infection through unprotected intercourse. The final categorisation signified 
that a defendant must inform the complainant of their status and the risk of the virus 
being transmitted.  
 
Basic disclosure denotes that factual consent will be achieved on all occasions, but 
the deficiencies of facilitating a limited obligation on the part of the defendant are 
evident. There is no certainty that normative consent will always be attained.  There 
is, however, certainty of normative consent identified within a number of U.S. State 
laws.281 The investigation identified that disclosure of HIV status, and the risk therein, 
were pre-requisites for the defence of consent to operate. It is evident that this 
requirement fulfils the obligation of a fully informed consent, but does not articulate 
the most pertinent approach, as the majority of individuals would already be aware of 
the risks of intercourse with an HIV+ individual. 
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Ohio’s provision identifies that a basic disclosure may be adequate.  This did not 
denote this is always the requirement as the provision may expect an enhanced 
disclosure if the circumstances dictate this facilitation.282 It is with that in mind that 
the suggested statutory provision adopted the same elements. It is propounded that 
the most appropriate route to construct an optimal legislative framework is via a 
template that provides for basic and enhanced disclosure, a quasi-enhanced 
disclosure. This takes into consideration that the majority of individuals would be 
aware of the risk of sexual intercourse with an HIV+ defendant, and provides an 
effective consent on all occasions.   
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